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Alvin Plantinga
Bait and Switch
Sam Harris on free will.
Harris' notion of freedom is really an idea of what we might call maximal autonomy. It's obvious that we don't have maximal autonomy; we aren't free in that sense. Indeed, it isn't so much as possible that we be free in that sense. That is because, as he thinks of it, I act freely on a given occasion only if I myself freely choose to have the desires and affections I then act on, and furthermore I myself freely bring it about that I do have them. But note that the action by which I bring about that I have those desires and affections must itself be free. That means that I must have freely brought it about that I had the desires and affections out of which I acted in bringing it about that I have the desires and affections I presently have. You can see where this is going: for every occasion on which I act freely, there must have been an earlier occasion in which I acted freely. This clearly involves an infinite regress (to use the charming phrase philosophers like): if Harris is right, it is possible that I act freely only if it is possible that I perform an infinite number of actions, each one a matter of bringing it about that I have a certain set of desires and affections. Clearly no one has time, these busy days, for that. Harris is certainly right that we don't have that maximal autonomy; but nothing follows about our having freedom, i.e., the sort of freedom we ordinarily think we have, the sort required for moral responsibility.
What we have here looks like a classic bait and switch: announce that you will show that we don't have freedom in the ordinary sense required by moral responsibility, and then proceed to argue that we don't have freedom in the sense of maximal autonomy. It is certainly true that we don't have freedom in that sense: not even God could have that kind of freedom. That is not because God could not have performed infinitely many actions—no doubt he could have—but because God is necessarily all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfectly good. This means that God has not freely chosen to have that character; there never was a time at which he had both the power to bring it about that he had that character, and also the power to bring it about that he did not have that character.
It's not at all clear to me why Harris devotes most of his energy to arguing that we don't have maximal autonomy. But he does also declare that we don't have freedom in the ordinary sense: "we know that determinism, in every sense relevant to human behavior, is true. Unconscious neural events determine our thoughts and actions—and are themselves determined by prior causes." How do we know that? Harris puts it like this: "Either our wills [i.e., our decisions and choices—AP] are determined by prior causes and we are not responsible for them, or they are the product of chance and we are not responsible for them." Another way to put it: either I am determined to do what I do by prior causes, or I do what I do by chance. In the first case I clearly don't have freedom. But the same holds in the second: if what I do happens just by chance, then too I don't do it freely (if I can be said to do it at all), at least not in a way which implies that I am responsible for that action.
This is a familiar argument, and one with a long history. But is it a good argument? I don't think so. Why think that if it is within my power to perform an action, but also within my power to refrain from so doing, then what I do happens just by chance? Maybe I have a good reason for doing what I do on that occasion—then it wouldn't be just by chance that I do it. Last Sunday you contributed money to your church; no doubt on that occasion it was within your power to refrain from contributing. But it surely wasn't just by chance that you made that contribution. It isn't as if you just flipped a coin: "Heads, I'll contribute; tails, I won't." No; you had a good reason for contributing: you want to promote the good things your church does. We Christians think God freely arranged the whole marvelous scheme of Incarnation and Atonement, whereby we sinners can once more be in a proper relationship with God. God did this, and did it freely; it was within his power to refrain from so doing, thus leaving us in our sins. But it surely doesn't follow that he did it just by chance!
This argument is a complete failure. There is one further kind of argument that Harris presents. He considers cases in which someone performs an act of horrifying evil: he enters a crowded movie theater and begins shooting. We then learn that this person is suffering from an invasive brain tumor or a serious psychological disorder; this makes us disinclined, or anyway less inclined, to hold him responsible for his action. That's because we think this person was caused to behave in this way by the tumor, and wasn't really free to act in any other way at the time of that behavior. So we recognize that people are sometimes unfree in their actions. But then, says Harris, can't we see that the same really goes for any other behavior on the part of that person, or any other person? If the killer's behavior is determined by previous circumstances and natural laws, isn't the same thing true of the behavior of any human being in any circumstance? He apparently thinks there is no relevant difference between a case in which a normal person kills someone else just for the thrill of it, and a case in which someone does the same thing, but is suffering from a brain tumor "the size of a golf ball in his medial prefrontal cortex." As he says, "There is no question that our attribution of agency can be gravely in error. I am arguing that it always is."
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Mike Talbert
I found myself intrigued by this article and wrote for myself a long essay on the subject, looking at the scientific deterministic approach that in its logical ad infinitum takes every move thought and other mass/energy/dimension movement an inevitable accident of the yet unexplained asymmetry of the big bang. At some point in there the concept of free will can fit in that determinism, or it can be part of the scientific proof of divinity. It is the stuff of a vibrant, prayerful discussion over a cup of coffee at the Grill.
Mark Christensen
Atheists such as Harris are condemned to such bizarre views. Having killed off God (in their mind at least), there can no longer be a justifiable gap between the intelligible self and maximal autonomy. Our motives and actions cannot include metaphysical understanding based on our inner connection with what lies Beyond. It's the perverse outcome of backing reason all the way: it tries to count to a transcendent infinity. And when it realises the trap, reverts to zero! The core issue isn't determinism but rather the fact that we must, for practical purposes, put our epistemological needs before our (higher) ontological and spiritual needs. If we told the truth all the time, we'd forgo the opportunity of ever literally understanding it. It's an impossible choice: Be the truth and never know why it is important, or do otherwise and try to grasp what only be experienced. The essential value of religion is its tolerance of the futile metaphysics. Secularism has no such release valve.
Jeremy
@Jonathan Allen; I suspect the reason is that Harris is a neuroscientist and interested in understanding how humans work from that perspective. I doubt considerations of philosophy play as much of a role as just trying to figure out what is true, and having concluded a common belief is not true, trying to argue why he feels that way.
OTM
I can't believe that Plantinga, a philosopher who has been on the scene for decades, has written an article which so thoughtlessly glosses over the arguments it attempts to refute. I know his speciality is philosophy of religion, but his arguments against Harris's reasons for our lack of free will just miss the point completely. Anyone who thinks they are convinced by this needs to do some more reading of the other side of the argument.
William Gavin
This is a learned and interesting article. But so far as I could tell, it does not mention the most puzzling aspect of Mr. Harris's thesis: If Mr Harris is correct in asserting that we are determined, then his very assertion is determined. And so is Prof. Plantinga's reply. And so is what I am writing. And so is every assertion of anything, anywhere. Are Mr. Harris's assertions true? How can one tell, if we are all determined? If he did not choose to write what he wrote, (and I am not free to write what I am writing) what is the debate all about--and is it even a debate? Obviously Mr. Harris feels that what he writing is true. But, according to him, that belief is determined also. But, if he is correct, in what case could it be said that what he has written is false? Any such statement would also be determined. For all I know, Mr. Harris may be right. But if he is, then what he said is neither right nor wrong: it just is, like an apple falling from a tree
manchile
I remember few years ago telling my friends that they can not brag or feel ashamed of who they are; the reason I told them was because they are not accountable for it; they did not choose who they turn out to be; from the physical look to the character they have. One does no have the power to select from which egg and sperm he is going to be manufactured. Poor thing did not even exist when every thing was engineered for him / her. After I told them about my theory, well they were puzzled; did not get me. Now I see Sam Harris speaking my mind. I am sure this book can enlighten them ; would do better job than I did. Generally speaking ,this concept eventually, as people evolve, will be translucent. It would have been easy for people to understand it if it was not to the impenetrable nature of religion which prohibits scientific beliefs from spreading. I believe concepts like this is beneficial to people and bolsters the understanding of people among themself creating harmony and m
Ted Schrey Montreal
It is reasonable to assume cognitive malfunction can take away a person's freedom, as the writer points out. Few would disagree. But is also seems perfectly acceptable and rational to say properly functioning cognition must be based on prior reasons and assumptions, which, in the context of personal freedom and free will, could amount to the understanding no cognitive insights can possibly illuminate higher order concepts such as free will. This seems to be Harris's view. I would hope it to be everyone's view. This leads me to my usual irritation with the pretensions of those who believe in God and claim to know his qualities and attributes. I realize orthodoxies of any stripe have their own built-in certainties and limitations, which serve to prevent all change in understanding. So be it, although it is very tiresome and predictable.
Axel Kassel
I chose not to click on the link to buy Harris's book, having concluded that anything he said in it was predetermined and not actually "his" product. QED.
Jonathan Allen
I would have enjoyed some analysis of why Harris et al feel compelled to confront ideas of free will. So far as I can tell, most of the 'New Atheist' sorts identify, in one way or another, with the Western liberal tradition, which has generally had a strong libertarian (in the political, not necessarily philosophical sense) strand to it, even in its current sublimated, statist forms. A recognition of human freedom in some sense seems to be required for adherence to the liberal tradition and the whole panoply of rights-language and political ideology and practice inherent therein: all things I don't imagine a Harris or a Hitchens or whoever would wish to deny. Why then seek to undermine the seeming basis of one's guiding political ideology? How do the New Atheists reconcile the (perhaps) inherent anti-liberalism of some of their philosophical constructions with their strong commitment to contemporary liberalism as the guiding principle of the State?
Frank Knarf
Harris's a priori assumptions are just as silly as Plantinga's perfectly good god.
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