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Alvin Plantinga
Bait and Switch
Sam Harris on free will.
Sam Harris claims that free will is an illusion. What we ordinarily believe in this neighborhood, he says, is completely mistaken: "You will do whatever it is you do, and it is meaningless to assert that you could have done otherwise"; "we know that determinism, in every sense relevant to human behavior, is true." Doesn't that imply that we human beings are not responsible for what we do? Harris is willing to bite the bullet: "we can no longer locate a plausible hook upon which to hang our conventional notions of personal responsibility." Indeed, he thinks that the illusion of free will is itself an illusion: what he means by this is that when we introspect very carefully we find that we don't really believe what we think we believe about free will.
The first thing to see is that there is a serious problem, in this book, about precisely what free will is supposed to be. As we usually think of it, free will has to do with actions and decisions; it is actions and decisions that are free or unfree. You have free will on a given occasion just if you could have done otherwise—i.e., just if it was within your power, on that occasion, to act differently from the way in which you did act then. And the fact is we instinctively believe that, on many occasions, we could indeed have done otherwise; we go on to think that on these occasions, we are accordingly responsible for what we did. Suppose I shade the truth or tell a lie in a misguided effort to make myself look good; our conviction, ordinarily, is that I could have refrained from telling that lie, am responsible for telling it, and am guilty for lying. We believe that on that very occasion it was within my power to refrain from lying, even though I did lie; and I am responsible for that lie just because it was within my power then not to lie. I make my modest contribution to my church; we think that it was within my power to refrain from doing so, so that my contribution is a free action. I freely decide whether to wear a blue shirt or a brown shirt; it was within my power to decide either way.
Now as far as I can tell, Harris does indeed mean to argue that we do not have free will in that sense, and I'll examine his arguments below. But his main target, at least the one on which he expends the most energy, seems to be something quite different. It's free will thought of in a wholly different way that he chiefly attacks. How does Harris think of free will? "Consider what it would take to actually have free will. You would need to be aware of all the factors that determine your thoughts and action, and you would need to have complete control over those factors."
His thought seems to be that first, there are some factors that determine my thought and action—i.e., factors that make it the case that I can never think or do anything other than what I do think or do; among these factors would be my desires, my character, various neurological factors, and so on. And second, I would have free will only if I had complete control over those factors—only if I freely chose them. I have free will only if I choose the sorts of desires and affections that I actually have; I am free only if I choose to have the character I do have, and indeed freely bring it about that I have that character. Suppose I have this strong desire to be approved of by others, and suppose I act in a way I think will promote others' having a good opinion of me. According to Harris, I am free in so acting only if I myself chose to have that desire and I myself brought it about that I do have that desire. If instead I just find myself with that desire (have not chosen to have it), then no action I take because of that desire is a free action. I want my church and indeed God's kingdom to prosper: when I act out of that desire—e. g., by financial contribution—I act freely, says Harris, only if I myself chose to have that desire, and brought it about that I do have it. He quite rightly says, "I cannot take credit for the fact that I do not have the soul of a psychopath," but from that he infers that he is not free.
Now this is vastly stronger than freedom as we ordinarily think of it. Harris notes that freedom is deeply involved in our notions of responsibility, guilt, and punishment. But freedom in his maximally strong sense is not required for responsibility or guilt or punishment. Suppose I know what is right on a given occasion, have the power to do the right thing but also the power to do something wrong, and in fact do something wrong. I quite consciously shade the truth, knowing perfectly well that doing so is wrong, and even though it is entirely within my power to tell the sober truth. Then I am responsible for being less than honest, and guilty for so doing. Nor is it required, for freedom, that I myself chose the desire to be thought highly of, or that I myself brought it about that I know that so doing is wrong.
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Mike Talbert
I found myself intrigued by this article and wrote for myself a long essay on the subject, looking at the scientific deterministic approach that in its logical ad infinitum takes every move thought and other mass/energy/dimension movement an inevitable accident of the yet unexplained asymmetry of the big bang. At some point in there the concept of free will can fit in that determinism, or it can be part of the scientific proof of divinity. It is the stuff of a vibrant, prayerful discussion over a cup of coffee at the Grill.
Mark Christensen
Atheists such as Harris are condemned to such bizarre views. Having killed off God (in their mind at least), there can no longer be a justifiable gap between the intelligible self and maximal autonomy. Our motives and actions cannot include metaphysical understanding based on our inner connection with what lies Beyond. It's the perverse outcome of backing reason all the way: it tries to count to a transcendent infinity. And when it realises the trap, reverts to zero! The core issue isn't determinism but rather the fact that we must, for practical purposes, put our epistemological needs before our (higher) ontological and spiritual needs. If we told the truth all the time, we'd forgo the opportunity of ever literally understanding it. It's an impossible choice: Be the truth and never know why it is important, or do otherwise and try to grasp what only be experienced. The essential value of religion is its tolerance of the futile metaphysics. Secularism has no such release valve.
Jeremy
@Jonathan Allen; I suspect the reason is that Harris is a neuroscientist and interested in understanding how humans work from that perspective. I doubt considerations of philosophy play as much of a role as just trying to figure out what is true, and having concluded a common belief is not true, trying to argue why he feels that way.
OTM
I can't believe that Plantinga, a philosopher who has been on the scene for decades, has written an article which so thoughtlessly glosses over the arguments it attempts to refute. I know his speciality is philosophy of religion, but his arguments against Harris's reasons for our lack of free will just miss the point completely. Anyone who thinks they are convinced by this needs to do some more reading of the other side of the argument.
William Gavin
This is a learned and interesting article. But so far as I could tell, it does not mention the most puzzling aspect of Mr. Harris's thesis: If Mr Harris is correct in asserting that we are determined, then his very assertion is determined. And so is Prof. Plantinga's reply. And so is what I am writing. And so is every assertion of anything, anywhere. Are Mr. Harris's assertions true? How can one tell, if we are all determined? If he did not choose to write what he wrote, (and I am not free to write what I am writing) what is the debate all about--and is it even a debate? Obviously Mr. Harris feels that what he writing is true. But, according to him, that belief is determined also. But, if he is correct, in what case could it be said that what he has written is false? Any such statement would also be determined. For all I know, Mr. Harris may be right. But if he is, then what he said is neither right nor wrong: it just is, like an apple falling from a tree
manchile
I remember few years ago telling my friends that they can not brag or feel ashamed of who they are; the reason I told them was because they are not accountable for it; they did not choose who they turn out to be; from the physical look to the character they have. One does no have the power to select from which egg and sperm he is going to be manufactured. Poor thing did not even exist when every thing was engineered for him / her. After I told them about my theory, well they were puzzled; did not get me. Now I see Sam Harris speaking my mind. I am sure this book can enlighten them ; would do better job than I did. Generally speaking ,this concept eventually, as people evolve, will be translucent. It would have been easy for people to understand it if it was not to the impenetrable nature of religion which prohibits scientific beliefs from spreading. I believe concepts like this is beneficial to people and bolsters the understanding of people among themself creating harmony and m
Ted Schrey Montreal
It is reasonable to assume cognitive malfunction can take away a person's freedom, as the writer points out. Few would disagree. But is also seems perfectly acceptable and rational to say properly functioning cognition must be based on prior reasons and assumptions, which, in the context of personal freedom and free will, could amount to the understanding no cognitive insights can possibly illuminate higher order concepts such as free will. This seems to be Harris's view. I would hope it to be everyone's view. This leads me to my usual irritation with the pretensions of those who believe in God and claim to know his qualities and attributes. I realize orthodoxies of any stripe have their own built-in certainties and limitations, which serve to prevent all change in understanding. So be it, although it is very tiresome and predictable.
Axel Kassel
I chose not to click on the link to buy Harris's book, having concluded that anything he said in it was predetermined and not actually "his" product. QED.
Jonathan Allen
I would have enjoyed some analysis of why Harris et al feel compelled to confront ideas of free will. So far as I can tell, most of the 'New Atheist' sorts identify, in one way or another, with the Western liberal tradition, which has generally had a strong libertarian (in the political, not necessarily philosophical sense) strand to it, even in its current sublimated, statist forms. A recognition of human freedom in some sense seems to be required for adherence to the liberal tradition and the whole panoply of rights-language and political ideology and practice inherent therein: all things I don't imagine a Harris or a Hitchens or whoever would wish to deny. Why then seek to undermine the seeming basis of one's guiding political ideology? How do the New Atheists reconcile the (perhaps) inherent anti-liberalism of some of their philosophical constructions with their strong commitment to contemporary liberalism as the guiding principle of the State?
Frank Knarf
Harris's a priori assumptions are just as silly as Plantinga's perfectly good god.
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